Co-director of the Centre for Caucasus Studies, shares
his views on the situation in Chechnya.
Also taking part in the discussion were Yuri Djibladze, Elena
Topoleva, Masha Gessen and Julia Kachalova.
At a press conference on February 23rd, the heads of a number of
non-profit organizations announced the start of a nationwide campaign by
Russia's "third sector", calling for the withdrawal of Federal
troops from Chechnya, and an end to the war there.
We were a bit nervous preparing for our meeting with the journalists,
inasmuch as we were expecting to be grilled on the possible consequences
of taking this or that political step. Being far removed from politics,
we didn't think it proper for us to judge the pros or cons of the different
ways of managing the conflict which had been put forward by the leaders
of various political parties and blocs. That's something for the politicians
to do. We were certain only that the war should be stopped, and that Federal
troops should be withdrawn from the territory of the Chechen Republic.
On the eve of the press conference, we met with the Co-director of the
Centre for Caucasus Studies, the famous scholar and writer Aleksandr Iskandryan.
We asked him how, in his view, the withdrawal of troops would affect the
situation in both Chechnya and Russia, and what long-term consequences
we can expect from the conflict itself. Our conversation with Iskandryan--who
has been to Chechnya many times over the last year and a half--helped give
us a view of the Chechen problem entirely different from that provided
by official circles.
Opponents of a withdrawal of Federal troops from Chechnya claim
that such a move would be followed by a bloodbath, with hundreds of thousands
dead from the remaining ethnic Russian population, and segments of the
anti-Dudayev opposition. Is this realistic?
According to official data released prior to the introduction of Federal
troops into Chechnya, the whole operation was mounted because in the three
years of Dudayev's rule (before October 1994), thirty thousand people there
either died or disappeared without a trace. Again according to official
data, one year after the outbreak of war, fifty thousand people have died
in Chechnya. I submit that both these figures are a lie: the first is inflated,
and the second is too low. But even if you believe this data, simple arithmetic
shows that an immediate withdrawal of troops would lead, without any doubt,
to a decrease in the number of casualties. Even if you suppose that some
sort of "ethnic cleansing" could follow a troop withdrawal as
a kind of revenge, these would be isolated events. They'd be carried out
with Kalashnikovs, not Su-27s: they wouldn't be mass slaughters, or the
indiscriminate bombing of whole cities.
So far as ethnic Russians are concerned, there are very few of them
left in Chechnya. They're primarily old people, and 80 percent of these
are women. There is one other group of ethnic Russians--these are also
women, integrated into Chechen society. I don't think they'd be touched.
At least, no one has touched them so far. In Chechnya, there is no ethnic
hostility between Chechens and Russians. The Chechens battling Federal
troops consider themselves soldiers of the Republic of Ichkeriya, fighting
against the Russian Federation. People, including Russians, are dying at
the hands of Federal forces. This is easy to understand in the case of
Grozny. Grozny has always been a Russian city, with very few Chechen inhabitants.
By calling on traditional means, it was far easier for Chechens to get
out of the city than it was for Russians. By the time military operations
began, the only people left in Grozny were peaceful civilians, mostly Russians,
and the young Chechens who were ready to fight. There were very few losses
among the fighters. Principally, people died from the bombardment. Peaceful
civilians. Russians. Russians were bombarding a Russian city. The Chechens
have studiously avoided the manner of fighting which the Russians have
tried to foist upon them.
Regarding the Anti-Dudayev opposition, it existed only before the introduction
of Federal troops into Chechnya. At rallies now, people who earlier swore
opposition to the regime stand side-by-side with Dudayev supporters. Now,
the war isn't being fought between Dudayev's people and Russia. It's between
Ichkeriya and the Federal government. The political differences which existed
in Chechnya prior to the introduction of Federal troops have been reduced
to nothing by the Kremlin's actions. Before the introduction of troops
onto the territory of the republic, Zavgaev had a rather high approval
rating. Many people hoped that he could bring some kind of order to the
region. But after his riding into town in a tank, after his non-existent
"elections", after he's demonstrated to the people that everything
happening in Chechnya matters to him not in the least, Zavgaev can't even
get into Grozny. He's sitting in a bunker at the airport, surrounded by
his own police--who fight to the death--and Federal troops. Today, the
opposition numbers not more than a few hundred people.
Chechen society, which has been atomized down to the level of the village,
is, perhaps not surprisingly, quite stable. Power in the villages is in
the hands of the elders, and representatives of the village councils. After
the introduction of Federal troops, it could hardly have developed into
a full-fledged government, and remains at the village level. Thus, a complete
loss of control and degeneration into some sort of bloody nightmare is
extremely unlikely.
If you were president of the Russian Federation, which means would
you choose of ending the Chechen conflict?
In my view, the most sensible policy would be not a sudden withdrawal
of troops, but a gradual one, linked to the beginning of direct negotiations
with Dudayev. The question of Chechnya's status should not be examined
until peace has been restored to the republic, accompanied by parliamentary
elections, presidential elections, and a referendum on independence for
Chechnya. This is, for example, what the Israelis are doing right now in
Palestine, a way of avoiding sudden shifts in direction.
An immediate withdrawal of troops would result in the creation of some
kind of government or pre-governmental structures in Chechnya's atomized
society. Remember that during the three years when there weren't Federal
troops in Chechnya, no Chechen government was formed. Dudayev wasn't really
President; he held power only in grozny. Labazanov was in Urus-Martan;
someone else was somewhere else; and there was no one at all in the Naterech
region.
Ideally, we need to stimulate the creation of a Chechen government
or autonomy. We should already be holding negotiations on those problems
on which we can reach an agreement: definition of borders; trade; legitimating
the existing government; defining the status of Chechnya's citizens; and
economic and financial problems. Discussing these problems won't ruin either
the Russian side, or Dudayev's. They will lead to a peace process that
can immediately and dramatically reduce the level of confrontation. As
world experience shows, the negotiating process rapidly reduces the significance
of people like Dudaev and Basaev.
How will Russia be affected by the fact that no foundation for
a Chechen government will be laid?
It won't be affected at all. I'm talking about Chechnya, not Russia.
Let's say that Russia suddenly withdraws its troops, and sets up an impenetrable
border. (However, you can only take "impenetrable" with a grain
of salt. Dagestan, Ossetia and Ingushetiya are all part of Russia, and
in them, Chechens live everywhere. So it would be impossible to seal the
border completely. But let's suppose this anyway.) Everything would be
fine, in Russia. But Chechnya would remain a hotbed of permanent instability,
devoid of law and order. Remember: before the introduction of Russian troops,
Chechnya was in fact a haven not just for the Chechen mafia, but for criminal
elements from all over Russia. This was not because Dudaev welcomed them
with open arms; rather, it was due to the absence there of law enforcement
agencies.
If we now withdraw our troops immediately, no one will replace them.
There won't be any Chechen police force, since there is no legitimate government.
There's no legitimate government because no negotiations are being held,
and it's not clear just who Dudayev is or who he represents. There have
been no parliamentary elections in the republic. There's no constitution.
There's no president. Accordingly, there's no one who really wants to create
structures capable of controlling the situation in Chechnya; a police force,
for example.
Does this mean there can be no foundation for government laid
in Chechnya without Russia?
It's the Chechens' job to establish a government for themselves, of
course. The result of that process will be autonomy, a free association
of governments, or a new member of the CIS. I would like to say only that
this process can be made more smooth. It can be done without major interruptions,
without risk--and without the creation of an interminable "black hole"
in the Caucasus, armed to the teeth and having an illegitimate government
that swings from one extreme to the other.
Just who is the government in Chechnya right now remains an open
question. With whom can we conduct negotiations?
It's quite clear that Doku Zavgaev has no authority, even in his own
bunker. In the usual sense of the word, Dudayev represents authority, although
he's most likely just a symbol. In another sense, Maskhadov holds power.
In yet another, military commanders and the above-mentioned traditional
structures are the local authorities. We have to negotiate with the new
government, beginning with Dudayev. There's no other way. Eventually, Dudayev
will force us to hold talks with him. While the war in Chechnya was the
center of attention for Russia and the world community, there were no acts
of terrorism. They began only after they grew accustomed to the war and
started to forget about it. The next step might be an explosion in the
Moscow metro, or something of that sort. It's strange the authorities haven't
yet realized that you can't get rid of terrorism through police measures.
Look again at the Israeli experience. In order to negotiate with Yasser
Arafat, it was necessary to make him into something other than the representative
of a terrorist organization. They did this. First, they created a "quasi"-governmental
structure, the police. Then, they held elections. Arafat became head of
an autonomy, and now they'll negotiate with him on the status of the autonomy,
and its independence.
Only yesterday, we heard news reports about an Israeli bus being
bombed. Is this a one-time only incident, or the beginning of a new wave
of terrorism?
It's not just one of a kind, but Arafat didn't have anything to do
with it. It was carried out by the Hamas movement; they don't take orders
from Arafat, and he has absolutely no influence over them. As I already
said, the normalization of political structures leads to terrorism becoming
a more localized, marginal phenomenon, and losing the support of the majority
of the population. A large number of Palestinians do not, of course, support
the totally unrealistic demand of "all Jews should be sent back to
the countries they came from", which Hamas advocates. This point of
view is held only by a rather narrow grouping of terrorists. The more conditions
are normalized, the narrower this grouping gets. And clearly, it's easier
to deal with localized phenomena than with a situation where every kid
on the street is throwing rocks at Jewish cars. I'm not saying that the
process is easy; it's very difficult, and already has taken a long time.
Even if the policy is carried out wisely, individual groups who continue
to carry out terrorist acts will remain. But this will be only four or
five people. Fifty people. Maybe five hundred. But not a million!
Can you tell us what effect the presence of Federal troops in
Chechnya might have on the course of negotiations?
They won't have any effect on the course of negotiations. But they
will affect the situation in the republic. A withdrawal of Russian troops
should be a part of the overall negotiating process, stimulating the creation
of Chechen governmental structures. A withdrawal of Russian troops should
be one of the topics for negotiation. If the troops are withdrawn suddenly,
then we'll have to conduct negotiations on recognizing the independence
of Chechnya. If negotiations are held on the level of "Dudayev is
a criminal", then they're absolutely pointless. The topic for negotiations
will be the deciding factor in whether or not they'll go forward.
I'll give you another example from world experience. When the British
government declared they were ready to begin negotiations, the Irish ordered
a moratorium on their so-called "military operations", since
they decided that they could achieve their goals through other means. The
negotiations went on and on, without result. When the IRA was finally convinced
that the negotiations were leading to "The Irish are a bunch of bastards;
they have to give up their weapons", "military operations"
were renewed. Accordingly, it's important not just to begin negotiations,
but to understand why you're there, and what they're about. In a rigid
system of government, where power is exercised from the top down, the fact
that negotiations have begun signals the presence of some kind of aims
that should be pursued in their course. Under Russia's current system,
negotiations began by accident. It was also by accident that they were
cut short.
We're afraid that the war in Chechnya will have a long-term effect
as a "splitting of peoples". This means the geopolitical division
of Russia, and the appearance of various "phobias" based on ethnicity.
Do you also share these fears?
The Chechen crisis is a factor which can catalyze the growth in our
country of undesirable ethnic relations. The growth of ethnophobia began
immediately after the unsuccessful October putsch of 1993. The so-called
"Causasophobia" and "dark-skinnedophobia" started to
unfold in the mass media. It looks as though this was in fact a government
campaign to try and direct people's dissatisfaction towards "others",
against different ethnic groups. I don't think, however, that this was
done deliberately.
Of course, there are always reasons for ethnophobia, in any country.
Experience shows that if the number of ethnic minorities exceeds a certain
percent, and if they're sufficiently regarded as "outsiders",
this will lead to ethnophobia. Problems like this are found practically
everywhere in the West: with the Turks in Germany, the Algerian Arabs in
France, and the West Indian immigrants in Great Britain. In the US, ethnophobia
is directed in certain areas against Blacks, and elsewhere against Latinos.
Russia differs from the above countries in that, first of all, this
phenomenon is comparatively new, and our society has not yet been able
to develop a resistance to it. Second, since a civil society has not yet
taken shape, there are also no political blocs to fight against the ethnophobia
which exists in the minds of those who hold power in developed areas.
If in the West a politician of more or less important status begins
saying openly that the Turks, for example, are a criminal element, he becomes
an outcast: he'll be relegated to political fringe groups which represent
very narrow segments of society, and will have no real influence in mainstream
politics.
If we look at Caucasians in general and Chechens in particular, the
image of the "evil Chechen" who "creeps ashore and hones
his knife" is no recent creation, but dates back to the time of Pushkin
and Lermontov. Since the last century's Caucasus Wars, the warning "Don't
dare go to sleep; the Chechen roams across the river in the dark of night!"
has become ingrained in the Russian mass consciousness. The understanding
of this continues to be that the Chechen roams not on the other side of
the Moscow River, but across the Terek; that is, he's on his own native
soil, and the Russians have come to conquer his country, since Chechnya
then was still an independent country. This image of the wild savage was
resurrected again in an official media campaign of 1944, during the deportations
of suspected Nazi sympathizers to Siberia. Material appeared in the press
claiming that certain Caucasus nations supported Hitler, and presented
him with a white stallion, and lists of armed detachments that supposedly
backed Hitler were published. During the years of "developing Socialism",
under all the noisy fanfare about "friendship of peoples", the
fanning of ethnophobia ceased. In our time, with the help of the authorities
(who really don't understand what they're doing), this particular genie
has once again been let out of the bottle.
Today, the significance of the so-called "Chechen mafia"
has been greatly exaggerated, although Chechen, gangs are far from being
the largest in Moscow. The largest criminal organizations are multi-ethnic;
principally, they're Russian. This doesn't mean that Russians are any more
criminal than anyone else. It's just that Moscow is a Russian city. Of
course, ethnic crime does exist. In such gangs, non-Russians make up the
backbone of the organization. I've been told by specialists that among
these, Lithuanians have become quite powerful (something that no one ever
mentions), along with Ukrainian and Georgian gangs. There are also Chechens,
of course, but they're in no way the most powerful, inasmuch as there are
very few chechens in Moscow. I saw a completely ludicrous report in the
Russian press that said the "Chechen mafia" controls crime in
Germany, Great Britain, the United States and so on.
I'm not inclined to think that the Russian politicians calling for
Moscow to be "cleansed" of Caucasians are really chauvinists
and ethnophobes. They simply have to justify their actions and try to remain
popular. Unfortunately, the state of society is such that their approval
ratings will shoot up if they say "Every Chechen is either a murderer
or a bandit". There are no organized blocs of such politicians. They'd
probably be popular with the Germans who say "All Turks are bastards".
But the function of the State on the one hand, and the intelligentsia on
the other, is to fight against such people.
I'm somewhat acquainted with the German and American governments' programs
for fighting ethnophobia. They include special television shows and educational
programs, explaining that Turks aren't necessarily crooks and savages,
and not necessarily even garbagemen. They say that Turkey is a country
with a culture different from Germany's, and so on. It's hard to make such
programs--they require a lot of money--but in countries where people understand
that it's much easier to whip up ethnophobia than to combat it, they spend
the money.
And of course, fighting ethnophobia is a function of the intelligentsia.
Unfortunately, if one looks at Moscow empirically, a significant portion
of the intelligentsia doesn't combat Caucasophobia; at least, they don't
pay any attention to it. Second, "Easterners" represent a completely
different culture.
The problem is quite real, especially if one takes into account that
the Russian mentality has been distorted by seventy years of Soviet rule.
The Soviet babushka is used to the idea that only the State can carry out
trade. She's used to hearing people being called "speculators",
and to this day refers to those who don't work in a factory or on a collective
farm as "non-productive elements". This babushka thinks that
only those who grow fruit and vegetables should be able to sell them at
the market. But even this is bad, since trading is bad in general. And
then our babushka sees that Azerbaijanis trade. And not in potatoes, either,
but in bananas and kiwi fruit that they obviously didn't grow themselves.
This means that the Azerbaijanis are middlemen and speculators. The babushka
can't buy bananas or kiwis because they're too expensive. The many years
of Soviet power convinced her that she should be able to buy anything that's
displayed on the counter. It's hard for her to understand that she can't
buy them, but that somebody else might be able to. Moreover, these "speculators"
look different, behave differently, and talk among themselves in a different
language. There's a whole lot of them! And our babushka starts hating them.
Someone has to explain to her that these people have to travel around
the world in search of work, since the standard of living in their countries
is extremely low, industry has come to a standstill, and it's difficult
to find work. She has to be shown these television programs, and have it
pointed out that Muslim Magomaev, the famous Neapolitan-style singer, is
just as much an Azerbaijani as those sellers standing in the markets.
It's the job of society, the government and the intelligentsia to fight
ethnophobia. Unfortunately, they haven't realized that yet here. Even the
most liberal elements of society don't find it embarrassing to say "We
have to protect the Russian-speaking minority in Chechnya". Or, that
they're "killing our boys there". Apparently, the boys who are
dying on the other side aren't ours.
Ethnophobia is on the rise, and it won't stop with the Chechens. It's
already expanding to cover all Causasians, and to a certain degree Central
Asians, Ukrainians, and so on. This is very dangerous. We have to put the
genie back into the bottle. True, I'm afraid that we'll first have to establish
Russian civil society.
EPILOGUE
We too also believe that the first shoots of civil society have already
broken through the harsh soil of Russian reality. We include here the third
sector's campaign to end the war in Chechnya, which was first unveiled
by various Russian non-profit organizations. From the first day of the
war, human rights groups, women's groups, ecology and other organizations
have carried out a number of protests. Today, they have decided to present
a united front. At present, signatures are being collected in support of
non-profit organizations' petition for an end to the war. The plan is to
forward the petition to the President and government. If this proves ineffective,
we will have to resort to other methods of protest.
We propose that all Russian non-profit organizations come together
for this purpose. For this, we need the following information:
the name of the organization;
its city;
whether or not it will sign the petition;
the date;
the name of the head of the organization;
the name of the contact person;
and the organization's telephone, fax and e-mail numbers.
Every organization has its own contacts, address lists and data bases.
Tell everyone you can of the petition and its text. If the organization
for one reason or another cannot, or does not want to sign the petition,
individuals, workers and volunteers can add their signatures to it. In
this case, you must indicate your relation to the organization along with
your name. Private citizens who don't belong to a non-profit organization
cannot participate in this protest.
Information on joining in the petition can be sent via e-mail: asi@glas.apc.org,
nan@glas.apc.org; telephone numbers (095) 249-39-89 (ASI), (095) 126-34-75,
(095) 126-88-61 (the NAN Foundation); and by fax: (095) 310-70-76 (the
NAN Foundation).
PETITION
from Russian Non-profit Organizations to The
President of the Russian Federation, Members of the Government of the RF,
and Deputies of the RF Federation Council
Dear Mr. President, Dear Members of the Government, Dear Deputies
of the State Duma and Federation Council:
Russian private, non-profit organizations are petitioning you for
an immediate end to the war in Chechnya. In Russia today, these organizations
already number more than 40 thousand, and they bind together more than
a million members and volunteer workers. All of us--human rights workers,
ecologists, employees of charitable foundations, women and youth movements,
associations of leading figures in science, culture, education and other
social groups--are working in these organizations because we both wish
and believe it possible that we, united with those who share our views,
can change life for the better, and help those in need of help. This is
the very foundation of democracy, and of the civil society for which we
are all striving. We cannot simply stand by and watch what is happening
in Russia; we cannot remain aloof from the war in Chechnya, which has already
lasted for more than a year.
This war will not only result in thousands of deaths on the battlefield,
but will divide the multi-ethnic peoples of Russia for years to come; it
will doom the people to decades of living in fear of terrorism, new bloodshed,
and the continuation of an endless cycle of revenge and desperation. We
consider the war in Chechnya a disgrace for our country, barbaric, and
a great disaster for our people. There is nothing more important for Russian
society than ending the war in Chechnya. We cannot hold elections, or introduce
new laws, economic policies or social programs while the main question
remains unresolved: an end to the war. We demand the immediate withdrawal
of Federal troops from Chechnya, and an end to the bloodletting. We demand
that you stop the war!
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